I read somewhere that going into a bank for the first time is like going into a church. It occurred to me that, in both buildings, there is an invisible force which operates only as long as people believe that it is there. I said this to a Marxist academic who agreed but added, "But, in the bank, there really is an invisible force." Is there? Money is an elaborate fiction but, at however many removes, is based in real material wealth. Pounds, dollars and bank statements would be worthless paper if there were no products of mental and manual labour to exchange.
Laurinda Ashcroft walks through the restored English countryside, sits in a preserved English church and, not in the church but back in her underground home, converses with Terra Central who offers her a kind of immortality. To us, Terra Central is imaginary, as yet. To Laurinda, Terra Central is based not in an imaginary or immaterial realm but in physical systems but not in any one system and is free of the conflict between instinct and intellect. Consciousness, having projected deity, now transcends its origins. Trilobites emerged from the sea. Consciousness emerges from organicism.
19 comments:
Kaor, Paul!
I never had that kind of feeling about banks, that they were somewhat analogous to Catholic churches. To me, banks are simply places of business for financial transactions, small or large.
And that exchanging of the "...products of mental and manual labour..." is only possible because of the value placed or not placed on them by other people.
Ad astra! Sean
Social beliefs are real -- real enough to kill you, often enough, and it doesn't get realer than that.
So the "invisible force" in a church (or mosque or temple) is every bit as 'real' as money.
For that matter, goods and labor as Sean pointed out, only have value as people -want- them and are willing to exchange something else for them.
There is no such thing as 'real' or 'inherent' value in anything, only exchange value.
To illustrate: as a thought experiment, imagine an isolated village that has a cobbler.
He takes leather, his skilled labor, his tools and so forth, and makes shoes.
Valuable, right?
Everyone in the village needs shoes once or twice a year, and they trade him food and services for them.
But imagine that he goes berserk and suddenly makes everyone in the village a -dozen- pairs of shoes a year, or two or three dozen.
What's the value of the extra shoes?
They have the same raw materials, skill, labor-time and everything as the ones he made before... but they're -worth- little or nothing.
Because nobody wants them enough to give anything they value for them.
See?
Nothing is 'worth' more than someone else is willing to give for it.
Kaor, Mr. Stirling!
Exactly! And I tried to make similar points using analogous examples. The labor theory of value simply does not WORK.
Ad astra! Sean
It remains the case that labour produces what people need, want and value.
Kaor, Paul!
It also remains the case that labor only has value if OTHERS value it.
Ad astra! Sean
Sean,
Sure. That is obvious. I do not quite see what the point is here.
Paul.
Sean,
I think that you disagree with the proposition that labour creates value but agree with the proposition that labour creates things that people value? I think that I can live with the second proposition.
Paul.
Paul: no, it's a rejection of the proposition that anything has -inherent- value.
As I pointed out, value is contingent on people wanting the thing valued.
The identical product produced in identical ways -- those shoes -- can have value, or be worthless (worth less than the raw materials) depending entirely on what someone else is willing to -give- for it.
Marx's distinction between "use-value" and "exchange-value" assumes that something can have -inherent- value.
But it can't, because value is conferred not by the process of -production- but by -consumption-.
In essence, value is a psychological phenomenon, conferred by -belief-.
Kaor, Mr. Stirling!
Exactly! Nobody would value shoes, gold coins, or diamonds if people did not WANT them.
Marxist economics simply does not WORK.
Ad astra! Sean
Use-value: Potatoes grown to be eaten.
Exchange-value: Potatoes grown, in much larger quantities, to be sold.
I think that that distinction makes sense. People need to eat so their valuing of food is not arbitrary.
BTW, I didn't expect my reference to exchange of products of labour to generate this discussion. How should I have phrased it to avoid controversial implications?
Paul: they're grown to be sold so they can be eaten. They have value because people want them to eat them.
If they didn't want them -- say there are too many, or their religion forbids them -- then they have no value.
Sean: it would be more accurate to say that it's based on false distinctions and assumptions.
I certainly agree that the use value is primary.
There is an important economic distinction between a man growing a few potatoes to eat and a lot to sell. Massive social changes have occurred. Eating remains basic.
Kaor, Mr. Stirling and Paul!
Mr. Stirling: I agree. Which is why the best, most realistic economists, starting with Adam Smith and going on to writers like Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk (spelling?), Ludwig von Mises, Milton Friedman, etc., should be periodically reread.
Paul: Not "use value." The DESIRE for potatoes, shoes, gold coins, diamonds, whatever, has to come FIRST.
Ad astra! Sean
Sean,
In the case of food, the physical need precedes and generates the psychological desire. Other desires come after that, of course.
Paul.
It matters and makes a difference to a farmer whether he is growing a potato to use it or to exchange it. I think this point is valid while another point, that people only pay for what they want, is also valid.
Kaor, Paul!
I agree physical hunger stimulates the desire for food. I think it's also valid to say a farmer can grow potatoes to satisfy multiple desires. I agree with your last sentence.
Ad astra! Sean
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