We often read the adventures of fictional intelligence agents but how often do we learn the repercussions of their work? This post focuses on James Bond, Dominic Flandry and Terai Lohannaso.
When Bond prevents the theft of gold from Fort Knox, the immediate consequences for him are:
speeches at the Bureau of the Mint;
lunch with top brass at the Pentagon;
an embarrassing brief interview with the President;
long debriefing in Edgar Hoover's offices;
quick debrief with M on the British Embassy trans-Atlantic scrambler and the order to return home.
When Flandry introduced a young Merseian officer to debaucheries on Talwin and asked that officer about a member of a previously unknown species in the Merseian group, he gained some intelligence about the planet Chereion which was later shared with Chunderban Desai, High Commissioner of the planet Aeneas in the Virgilian System in Sector Alpha Crucis of the Terran Empire.
Terai, arriving in Vittohyra with intelligence about Project Orion, is greeted in the middle of the night by Kurawa of the Intelligence Corps, the director of the Maurai Inspectorate and the supreme commander of the occupation forces and is then rushed home for a month of:
11 comments:
Kaor, Paul!
It was not on Talwin that Flandry introduced that Merseian officer to certain debaucheries, but, I believe, on Jihannath.
And those Awaians were remembering how their islands had once been part of the long gone United States.
Ad astra! Sean
Sean,
TECHNIC CIVILIZATION SAGA, Vol IV, CAPTAIN FLANDRY: DEFENDER OF THE TERRAN EMPIRE, 9, p. 144. (Large format edition.)
Paul.
Kaor, Paul!
You are right, and I was wrong! This is what I read in Chapter 9 of THE DAY OF THEIR RETURN, from a response to question sent by Commissioner Desai to Terra: "He had been on temporary assignment to Talwin, since he was originally concerned in events leading to the joint Terran-Merseian research effort upon that planet (v. note 27) and his special knowledge might conceivably help in gathering militarily useful data. While there, he cultivated the friendship of a young Merseian officer. The intimation is he introduced the latter to certain debaucheries;..."
It's interesting to think Flandry again met Yydwyr the Seeker. And we know the Datholch called himself one of the disciples of Aycharaych.
Ad astra! Sean
This sort of stylized dance is common before major wars, particularly ones people see coming (like WWII).
Kaor, Mr. Stirling!
I agree, altho I would not have thought of calling these deadly dangerous intrigues, diplomatic maneuvers, and massing of military forces a "dance"! But I can see why some use that metaphor.
Ad astra! Sean
It's necessary. For example, the various governments in 1914 went to great lengths to demonstrate to their peoples that they weren't the ones "starting it". Even at the cost of severe military disadvantage; the French government refused Joffre, their Chief of Staff's, warning that being forbidden to cross into Belgian territory and to push forces right up to the French border was going to cost them heavily (this was quite true).
Germany went through a lot of diplomatic contortions to avoid being unambiguously the aggressor, mainly for domestic political reasons.
The "Burgfried" the civic truce, was dependent on this. It's why the Social Democrats voted for war credits.
Kaor, Paul!
Yes, I can see why internal politics would play a role in this kind of "dance." The great powers of 1914 had to at least go thru the motions of trying to peacefully resolve the Sarajevo Crisis. And I think many leaders were in fact sincere in trying to put out the fire before it spread too far.
Ad astra! Sean
Sean: all the leaders were willing to fight rather than surrender certain "red lines". The Germans and Austrian leaderships actively wanted war(*), though they would have been willing to settle for a diplomatic capitulation that destroyed the solidarity of the Entente.
(*) not that they wanted the war they actually got, of course. But they wanted -a- war.
Kaor, Mr. Stirling!
And by "red lines" you mean certain things the leaders of the various powers thought crucial for their countries existence. I can see that.
All the same I keep remembering how Wilhelm II of Germany did try to avert a general war. In fact, trying so hard that dispatches and reports relating to the Sarajevo Crisis were deliberately delayed from reaching him by pro-war officials. A point you yourself had made. Which I found shocking and nearly treasonous!
As you said, no one could have predicted how terrible the war they got would be! Not a brief few months clash--but a years long life and struggle.
And I think Francis Joseph of Austria-Hungary also did not want a war. But, he was a very old and tired man in 1914, and his reluctance was probably argued down.
Ad astra! Sean
In an authoritarian monarchy, sometimes you have to "manage" the monarch. Controlling the information that reaches him is an obvious way to do it.
Wilhelm was a notorious "weathercock", given to bombast, empty threats, sudden reversals, losing his nerve in a crisis, and listening to the last man to talk with him. Theodore Roosevelt once commented that he could have carved a better backbone out of a chocolate eclair.
The General Staff in Germany had learned this the hard way. They genuinely thought that Germany had to fight in 1914 or face certain defeat later; Wilhelm actually agreed with them, in the abstract and when he wasn't in a sudden panic or getting a brainstorm.
So they manipulated him when the Sarajevo assassination made him uncharacteristically firm for a while.
Also, Germany's system of government was dysfunctional -- there was no coordinating body that set overall strategy(*). In the absence of someone like Bismark, you had half a dozen contending agencies (and sub-agencies and factions and camarillas) vying to get their preferred policy implemented.
(The General Staff and the War Ministry were almost always at loggerheads, for instance, and both detested the Navy.)
(*) Britain had the Committee of Imperial Defense, which was an exception at the time.
Kaor, Mr. Stirling!
It would have been better for Germany and the world if Wilhelm II had again lost his nerve in 1914 and refused giving that "blank check" to Austria-Hungary. It might even have led to a strengthening of the position of the Chancellor, among other things.
I recollect you saying many German leaders were afraid Russia was becoming too strong for Germany to beat. That, given time for the reforms of Peter Stolypin to take root and for the deadwood to be cleared out of the Tsarist army, Russia would be unbeatable within five or ten years.
What Germany needed was its own Committee of Imperial Defense or a US style Defense Department, to make her armed forces TALK to each other and learn from each other.
Ad astra! Sean
Post a Comment