Comments On A Debate II

Science is applied to objects of different kinds, to objects with different kinds of properties. Although scientific method remains the same, the particular sciences have to differ to the extent that their objects do. Some sciences are more precise than others. Organisms have properties that they do not share with mechanisms. An astronomer cannot perform experiments as a physicist can: "Let us see what happens if we change the orbit of Sirius..." Computers can simulate cosmogonies and cosmologies but simulations remain abstractions. No one, as yet, replays the real universe.

If there were a science of mankind, then, in that case, the subject and object would be identical. Application of the science might start as some men acting on other men but it would have to become all men acting on themselves. We individually and collectively would apply the laws of mind and society to ourselves: the ultimate democracy.

But, meanwhile, can Poul Anderson's Psychotechnic Institute, starting to learn some of the laws, begin to apply those laws, through education and legislation, to the rest of society in such a way that that society starts to move towards full collective self-understanding and self-control? Would the active participation at least of a majority not be necessary from the beginning?

If we predict the orbit of the Moon, there is no danger that the Moon will overhear the prediction and deliberately set out to disprove it. Treating fellow human beings as objects that can be acted on from the outside sounds as if it might be a mistake from the beginning. If we can see a way forward for society, then we need to persuade others to accept it. As members of society, we have no alternative to discussing and arguing with other members of society about the way forward for society. (I think.)

Comments On a Debate About The Future

A frequent feature of sf dystopias is an argument between a proponent and an opponent of the dystopia, e. g.:

1984 by George Orwell
Brave New World by Aldous Huxley
Fahrenheit 451 by Ray Bradbury
Player Piano by Kurt Vonnegut
The Space Merchants by Frederick Pohl and CM Kornbluth
"'Repent Harlequin,' Said The Ticktock Man" by Harlan Ellison

Robert Heinlein's dystopia is "If This Goes On -" but I don't think that that work does give a platform to any proponent of the theocracy?

I summarized an excellent argument of this sort from Poul Anderson's "The Sensitive Man" a couple of posts ago here. In this case, however, Dalgetty defends not an existing dystopia but a projected utopia. In its early installments, the Psychotechnic History expresses optimism about the further future. The UN world government and its Un-men agents thwart attempts to revive nationalism and militarism. As we read further, however, we learn that the Psychotechnic Institute, advising the world government, and after that the Solar Union, cannot cope with the scale of technological unemployment. The Institute responds to increasing turmoil and opposition with unacceptable social manipulation and is outlawed.

Eventually, psychotechnicians do coordinate Galactic Civilization but that is tens of thousands of years later after two more Dark Ages and at least one slave-owning Empire. It sounds like real history: things might get better but not immediately. But, meanwhile, what do we think of Dalgetty's argument?

He explains that the Institute tries to change not just individuals or society but both. I agree with this approach. I used to get into arguments about whether society could be changed by changing individuals or vice versa but obviously it is possible, and urgently necessary, to work on both levels simultaneously.

Dalgetty argues that the Institute must work in secret. If I thought that they had a science of society as he describes it, then I would have to agree with him.

(Pause for food.)

A Debate About The Future

From Poul Anderson's "The Sensitive Man" (The Psychotechnic League, New York, 1981), a summary -

Dalgetty: The way to oppose a political opponent is to change the conditions under which he must work.
Elena: Change them to what?
Dalgetty: A sane world.
Elena: Maybe I agree with your opponent.
Dalgetty: Libertarian government has always broken down because there have not been enough people intelligent, alert and tough enough to resist the encroachments of power on liberty. The Psychotechnic Institute is trying to create such a citizenry and to build a society which produces such people but this will take more than three centuries.
Elena: You want to remake the world to your ideal whether they like it or not.
Dalgetty: The process will make them like it.
Elena: That is a worse tyranny...You are using your psychotechnic knowledge secretly instead of sharing it.
Dalgetty: We have to. Otherwise, people would resist what we are doing.
Elena: You are a clique of about a hundred.
Dalgetty: Our numbers are bigger than that.
Elena: It is the dictatorship of the intellectuals.
Dalgetty: We had to decide whether to destroy, publish or use our new knowledge. We know that freedom is metastable, not natural. Our opponent would use psychotechnics to make people want to end freedom and his goal is more easily attainable. Publishing our findings would lead to a war for control of the mind. That conflict would end in an undefeatable psychotechnic dictatorship.
Elena: You could inform the present government.
Dalgetty: Too risky.
Elena: How do you know the Institute won't become an oligarchy?
Dalgetty: I don't but it is improbable. We indoctrinate our recruits. Meanwhile, society is being modified. Critical thinking rejects propaganda.
Elena: The world is big and unpredictable.
Dalgetty: We take that chance.

Synthesis And Sensitivity

When I was a postgraduate philosophy student in 1973-'74, the Head of Lancaster University Philosophy Department told myself and some fellow students that he thought that the whole of philosophy was in a wretched state. One mistake had been to think that big questions, like "Does God exist?", could be answered in short books. Instead, a very long book would be necessary to answer a very small question, perhaps clarifying just one aspect of a single concept. And then who would be able to synthesize all the diverse answers to the many very small questions?

In Poul Anderson's "Un-Man," this question is asked not of analytic philosophy but of the empirical sciences:

"The sciences had grown too big and complex, like everything else, and there was too much overlap between the specialities. Further progress required the fully trained synthesizing mentality." (The Psychotechnic League, New York, 1981, p. 94)

This is provided by "...Synthesis..." which is described as "The multi-ordinal integrating education..." (ibid.) In the course of a conversation, a young Un-Man/Brother (see recent posts) sits still with a withdrawn expression while his trained mind assembles logic networks. He estimates an 80% probability that Arnold Besser, the chief of international finance, is head of "the gang," based on:

Besser's history and character;
his country's recent history;
the necessary communications for a least-effort planet-wide anti-UN group;
other factors that he does not enumerate.

Then he calculates the best plan for destroying the gang by assuming that Besser:

acts on a survival axiom;
acts logically apart from his inadequate grounding in current social theory and his personal bias.

Synthesis education is known to the public but the secret, more advanced, training involving:

physical exercises;
mental practice;
hypnotism;
diet;
other factors

- is intended "'...to produce the completely integrated human being.'" (p. 196)

This "Sensitive Man" has heightened senses, enabling him even to hear subvocalized thoughts, and also has "'...conscious control of certain normally subconscious and involuntary functions.'" (p. 198) Thus, he can temporarily increase his strength and speed and, consequently, is even more of a superman than the Un-men.

The Sensitive Man

In Poul Anderson's "The Sensitive Man" (The Psychotechnic League, New York, 1981), Dr Michael Tighe's "'...work was mostly in mass-action psych...'" (p. 196), but he also had:

"'...associates trying to understand the individual human being as a functioning mechanism. A lot's been learned since Freud, both from the psychiatric and the neurological angle. Ultimately, those two are interchangeable.'" (ibid.)

Are they? I think that the speaker here, who is the Sensitive Man himself, means "psychological" rather than "psychiatric." Freud was a psychologist, studying consciousness, whereas psychiatrists are doctors, treating mental illness. And human beings are organisms, not mechanisms.

A subjective account of an internally experienced mental process and an objective account of an externally observed cerebral process are simply different, although there is an empirical correlation between them. My brain is part of me as perceived by others whereas my consciousness is my perceptions of everything other than myself. Thus, my brain and my consciousness are not identical. Therefore, psychology and neurology are not interchangeable.

My brain can be described in terms of its sensory inputs and neural interactions whereas my consciousness can be described only by referring to its objects which may be absent, distant, past, future, abstract, imagined, fictitious, nonexistent, impossible, evaluative - black holes, the square root of minus one, moral and aesthetic judgments etc. We can think about the Philosophers' Stone but not sit on it and can look for the Holy Grail but not drink from it.

Consciousness is not, I think, an immaterial entity interacting with brains but is a qualitatively different level of organism-environment interaction that has emerged from, although it is not reducible to, molecular and cellular processes.

The History Of The Science Of Society

In Poul Anderson's "The Sensitive Man" (IN Anderson, The Psychotechnic League, New York, 1981, pp. 131-198), although Dr Michael Tighe is responsible for developing the fully integrated human being, and thus has worked in the fields of individual psychology and physiology, he also presents yet another summary of the history of the science of society:

Francis Bacon speculated about such a science;
Boole did some work on it;
Boole also invented symbolic logic;
Freudian psychology suggested human semantics;
mankind was studied physically, chemically and biologically;
Spengler, Pareto, Toynbee etc detected historical patterns;
cybernetic concepts like homeostasis and feedback are applicable to individual and society;
games theory, the principle of least effort and Haeml's generalized epistemology implied analysis of basic laws;
new logical and mathematical symbologies suggested formulations for handling data and indicating new data;
the Psychotechnic Institute collected and synthesized all earlier findings and made new discoveries.

This all sounds more firmly based than Asimov's/Seldon's merely mathematical "psychohistory," about which we are told only that, on a sufficiently large scale, it predicts accurately.

But how does symbolic logic help? I studied philosophy and therefore received an introduction to symbolic logic, both propositional and predicate calculus. In algebra, letters like "x" and "n" represent any number. In the propositional calculus, letters like "p" and "q" represent any proposition, which means "statement," not "proposal." Instead of mathematical symbols like +, - and x linking numbers, there are logical symbols linking propositions. The symbols mean:

if p, then p;
if p, then not not-p;
not (p and not-p);
p or not-p;
if (if p, then q) and p, then q.

The predicate calculus recognizes that each proposition has both a subject and a predicate. Thus:

All men are mortal;
Socrates is a man;
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

That can be expressed in symbols presenting a universal proposition followed by two particular propositions with a common subject but different predicates.

Thus, any line of argument can be abstracted from its subject matter and shown to be valid or invalid ((if p, then q) and q, therefore p, is invalid) but only if the argument is first presented in a large number of  propositions far more precise than are usually uttered.

I do not think that symbolic logic would help with a science of society any more than with any other subject matter but perhaps there were unrealistic expectations about its contribution at an earlier stage?