Sunday 15 October 2023

Dominic Flandry's Analysis Of The Merseian Raid On Gorrazan

The Game of Empire, CHAPTER TWELVE.

The Merseian detachment that raided Gorrazan could have smashed the Folkmoot and installed the Liberation Council which the Merseians had backed. Terra would either have intervened and got bogged down in a local war or done nothing and wound up with a Merseain-backed power at its back. The Merseians could also have travelled undetected to Gorrazan but instead made a point of being seen and intercepted and engaging with Terran border forces that were bound to be too small to stop them.

Outcomes:

endless wrangling about reparations for the Merseain-Terran battle near Alpha Crucis;

one Terran faction arguing that forces must be tied down to watch Gorrazan;

another faction arguing that the Liberation Council are harmless or even progressive and that the Merseian detachment was indeed, as claimed, on a mercy mission;

a boost for the pretender, Magnusson, who has the prestige of having defeated the Merseians but also promises a permanent peace with them.

Flandry, playing the role of armchair detective, is well on his way to solving the conundrum of Magnusson. 

13 comments:

S.M. Stirling said...

If there's a fault in this build-up to Magnusson's revolt, it's that the plan is overly complex.

One military maxim to keep in mind is that: "no plan survives first contact with the enemy's main force" - von Molkte the Elder.

Which is why another of his aphorisms is "Planning is everything, but the plan is nothing."

Meaning you have to be ready (with more alternative plans, among other things) to improvise under unforeseen circumstances.

The Meresian plan depends on everything going the way they want/expect. That does happen... once in a blue moon.

Something -always- gets fubar'ed. This is why fighting anyone who can really fight back is very, very tricky.

To Poul's credit, the Meresian plan does eventually collapse -- but (for obvious dramatic purposes) it's only at the last minute.

S.M. Stirling said...

Incidentally this is why, if you can, you should always avoid fighting people in your own league and concentrate on beating up on the weak.

That is, basically, how the British Empire was built -- minimal commitments to European conflicts with peer competitors, and concentrating on naval armaments(*) and expansion in the non-Western world, which at the time was an 'easy mark'.

In 1914 that was no longer possible, though it was what the British government had -planned-.

That is, they thought they could get away with a moderate sized army to help the French stave off defeat, plus financial aid and arms to the other Entente power, Russia, while grabbing off the prizes overseas, Germany's colonies and Ottoman territories.

Alas, that didn't prove to be possible; Germany turned out to be as strong as all the Entente Powers put together, and the strain of total war was fatal to the Empire's fabric.

But nobody had much idea of that beforehand, except a few of the extremely prescient or very pessimistic.

(*) which France, and later Germany, could not do to the same extent because they had land frontiers with powerful enemies.

Sean M. Brooks said...

Kaor, Mr. Stirling!

I don't think the Merseians would disagree that the problem with complex plans is how easily they can fall apart. I recall Flandry saying nearly two decades before, in A KNIGHT OF GHOSTS AND SHADOWS, that Aycharaych's equally complex plan for triggering a civil war in the Empire led by Dennitza tried to allow for unforeseen factors.

Your comments about WW I reminded me of a discussion I had years ago with a retired Major from the 81st Airborne. Either he or I suggested that instead of trying to build up a powerful surface Navy, Germany would have done better focusing on submarines. A fleet of 500 subs in 1914 could well have totally devastated both British commerce shipping and the Navy.

Ad astra! Sean

S.M. Stirling said...

Sean: hell, if Germany hadn't engaged in the naval race with Britain, Britain would have remained neutral in 1914!

Neutral long enough, at least.

In which case Germany would have won the war.

Jim Baerg said...

Another thing about WWI is that if not for Fritz Haber & Carl Bosch Germany couldn't hav kept fighting for more than a few months.

Sean M. Brooks said...

Kaor, Mr. Stirling!

An intriguing thought! But, I dunno, it was the invasion of Belgium by Germany which provoked the UK into declaring war on the Reich.

Ad astra! Sean

paulshackley2017@gmail.com said...

From DaveShoup2MD:

Major powers creating war plans based on their enemies doing exactly as expected was repeatedly shown as a recipe for disaster during WW II, which was the most recent great power conflict for Anderson and his generation of SF writers; not a huge jump from repeated examples of "things" not going as one might have hoped in that conflict, largely on the Axis side. The Allies - certainly the Americans - were much more realistic in their war plans, going back to the 19th Century, than the Germans and Japanese ever were.

"500 German subs in 1914" would have been quite the trick, given there were not 500 operational submarines in the world in 1914. And, like so many brilliant ideas, presumably a RN relieved from building capital ships would have, dunno, built escorts and started escort of convoy in 1914, instead.

Amazingly enough, historically, one side generally reacts to the cunning plans of the other, you know?

Was the "retired Major from the 81st Airborne" a Nigerian?

Sean M. Brooks said...

Kaor, Dave!

Remember what Stirling said, quoting von Moltke's aphorisms about both the necessity and drawbacks of having plans. Meaning some Germans understood the need not to get too attached to plans.

IIRC, Germany had 200 subs in 1914, but I might be wrong. My idea being that if Germany had used the resources expended on a surface Navy to doubling those subs instead, she would have gotten more bang for every reichsmark spent on the Navy.

In 1914 submarine warfare was very, very new. I do not believe any Navy had yet worked out the tactics and weapons needed for handling subs. Hence, speculatively, in the scenario I suggested, a Germany with 400 or more subs would have the advantages of shock and surprise as those subs attacked the UK's mercantile and Naval fleets. The UK would have needed time, say six months, for working out tactics for handling enemy subs. My suggested 400 subs could wreak truly devastating damage during those six months. Damage the UK might not have recovered from.

My online friend the retired Major was not Nigerian, whatever you meant by that.

Ad astra! Sean

DaveShoup2MD said...


200? You're off by a factor of 10.

"In 1914, Germany had just 20 U-boats."

Source:

https://www.theworldwar.org/learn/about-wwi/unrestricted-u-boat-warfare#:~:text=Germany%20built%20new%20and%20larger,of%20the%20world's%20merchant%20ships.

The US Army's 81st Infantry Division was just that; the 82nd "All American" Airborne division was the 82nd. The other US Army airborne divisions that saw active service after 1942 were the 11th, 13th, 17th, and 101st.

The 81st Division is a Nigerian Army division that traces its root back to WW II. It is also not an airborne division. ;)

Sean M. Brooks said...

Kaor, Dave!

Thank you for the corrections, they were appreciated.

But I still stand by my basic point: focusing on building subs would have done Germany far more good than the futile High Seas fleet during WW I. Concentrating on building/improving subs instead of dreadnoughts, battle ships, heavy cruisers, cruisers, etc., might have seen Germany entering the war with at least 100 subs. The inadequate number of submarines Germany did have did far more damage to the UK's mercantile/Naval fleets than her surface ships ever did.

I still believe crying "Havoc" and unleashing 100 sea dogs of war would have been devastating to the UK's shipping in the first months of the War!

It's been at least five years since I exchanged emails with that retired Major of the 82nd (not 81st) Airborne. Major VH might not even be still alive now, because he would be 82 in December.

Ad astra! Sean

paulshackley2017@gmail.com said...

From Dave:

Sean - Sure.

The point re the "early adoption of submarines" concept is simply that international relations is not a vacuum; and thoughtful consideration of a posited historical alternative requires that the underlying reality of such is the opposition gets to make it's own decisions. The Germans stop building surface ships after 1900 and start building submarines? Guess what, the British (and French, and Russians, etc.) are going to slow down their own capital ship programs and start building more escorts, develop convoy escort and routing procedures, exercise with such, etc.

To presume otherwise means handing out idiot balls, and as much as that crutch is relied upon by 90% of "alternate history" authors, it's pretty shoddy work, and - truthfully - moves the result from anything worth reading to fantasy; so if that's the road the author is going to take, why not give one side dragons and magic? It's certainly more entertaining. ;)

Beyond that, historically, various naval analysts suggested force structures built around a submarine force; none ever saw it as a desirable procurement strategy, for obvious reasons.









Sean M. Brooks said...

Kaor, Dave!

I tried to reply to you twice, but my comments disappeared both times. I'm a bit pressed for time now, but I will try to respond later, when I have more time.

Ad astra! Sean

paulshackley2017@gmail.com said...

From Sean:

Kaor, Dave!

I actually agree with you, it would be noticed by the UK, France, and Russia if Germany switched from building surface navy ships in 1900. I think you overlook one thing: how quickly or effectively would they react? Given the massive investment made in surface warships there would be resistance in all three countries to any decisive change of focus. A resistance that might take as long as ten years to overcome.

A Germany which followed this sub building program after 1900 would get at least a head start. Also, I believe the tactics you listed for handling sub attacks: escort warships, convoy and routing procedures, etc., would need time and hard experience in an actual war to be understood and worked out. Meaning Germany might still strike devastating blows on enemy shipping during the first six months of this alternate WW I.

Ad astra! Sean