I studied philosophy, which included philosophy of mind, but not psychology. I have also been misled by the similarity between the words "conation" and "cognition" and therefore thought that "conation" meant "knowing." The Wiki article (see the above link) differentiates three parts of the mind:
cognitive, intelligence;
affective, emotions;
conative, volitions -
- but I have also heard "affective" called "volitions" and "emotions" called "emotions" so there is no consistent terminology.
Before studying philosophy, I was taught that the (immaterial) soul comprises intellect and will. These would correspond to intelligence and volitions.
I now think that, both as a species and as individuals, we were active organisms long before we became reflective subjects. Life, when analyzed, already contains both the consequences of past actions and a tendency to continue acting in the same way even though this has been problematic. Indian philosophy rightly emphasizes "karma," action, and analyzes consciousness into subtler categories than "intellect" and "will."
15 comments:
Kaor, Paul!
But I simply don't believe in any kind of materialism. Mr. Wright's lengthy arguments against materialism continues to convince me.
Sean
Sean,
I argue that consciousness is not reducible to mechanics. It emerges from organism-environment interactions just as a new color emerges from mixing two other colors. Quantitative changes become qualitative.
Paul.
Kaor, Paul!
I'm sorry, but Mr. Wright's arguments on that very point convinced me that kind of materialism is also mistaken.
Sean
I incline to Penrose's "quantum mind" hypothesis, which boils down to mind being something in direct contact with the quantum-mechanical underpinnings of reality. It's not, in some respects, governed by the Newtonian (or even Einsteinian) physics of the macrocosmic world.
There's been some experimental results favoring Penrose's hypothesis lately.
If it's true, conventional computers can never be conscious, though you can design software to mimic some features of it.
Mr Stirling,
I reckon conventional computers can never be conscious because they merely do the equivalent of moving a tape with holes punched in it past a camera. The numbers of holes punched on each line on the tape are interpreted as data, e.g., about the ethnic groups in the British population, but consciousness of the data, and indeed of anything else, is in the brains of the people using the computer. However, a different kind of artifact might duplicate what the brain does, e.g., by directly contacting quantum reality. So conscious conventional computers no; conscious artifacts maybe.
Paul.
Dear Mr. Stirling,
I've actually heard of Penrose and I have one of his books. And his "quantum mind" hypothesis is one I've not heard of but seems very interesting.
Sean
Paul: yes, I'd agree with that. The brain does give rise to the mind, and the brain is a physical object, so it has to be theoretically possible to duplicate its function... just not with digital machinery of the type we use now.
Some people want to build quantum computers.
Sometime in the last few years of Poul's life he was a guest on the Compuserve SF forum. The topic of Penrose's ideas about 'quantum mind' came up. He expressed disappointment at the implication that AI would not happen. Someone else (me?) pointed out that it just means AI would likely only come later than if Penrose's ideas are not true.
Above, Sean refers to Mr. Wright's arguments without telling us what those arguments are.
Kaor, Paul!
Like you, Mr. Wright is s philosopher as well as being an SF writer and a former lawyer. If you mean is arguments against materialism, I am not competent to discuss such issues. But years ago, I did send you a link collecting many of Wright's arguments against materialism.
I know you have difficulties with Mr. Wright and I can see why! He has candidly admitted that Wrath is his besetting vice. But, after his conversion to Catholic Christianity he has tried much harder to control that tendency to anger, as can be seen from reading his often choleric essays while he was an atheist.
Ad astra! Sean
Sean,
I remember reading something by Wright anti-materialism. I think that essentially the same argument is deployed against reductionist mechanical materialism both by dualists and by dialectical materialists. There is an irreducible qualitative difference between empirically discernible neurological processes and directly experienced mental states. Therefore, the mental states are neither reducible to nor identical with the neurological processes. However, the latter somehow cause the former. This causal relationship is mysterious.
Paul.
Dialectical (developmental, interactive) materialists regard consciousness not as reducible to but as emergent from states of matter. Organisms interact with their environments. Some organisms become conscious of their environments. Consciousness is a property of such organisms and therefore is not ontologically independent. It is not an empirically observable property like size, shape, weight, colour etc. We do not observe consciousness but we know of it both because we are conscious and because we observe and respond to conscious behaviour, including linguistic behaviour, in other organisms.
Kaor, Paul!
I remain unconvinced by materialism, but I can only suggest proposing your arguments to someone like the late Mortimer Alder, who can respond much better than I to them.
Ad astra! Sean
Sean,
But materialism as I have presented it merely describes what has happened according to the empirical evidence. The universe was unconscious. Gravitation, electromagnetism and the nuclear forces can be fully described without attributing any consciousness to them. Organisms interacted sensitively with their environments. Sensitivity quantitatively increased until it was qualitatively transformed into sensation, i.e., became conscious. Consciousness is a property of some organisms. Perception and memory are not identical with but nevertheless dependent on brain states. I would need to be persuaded that consciousness had somehow preceded the evolution of organisms or could exist independently of them.
Paul.
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