Jack Havig discusses philosophy with the oldest of Robert Anderson's three sons:
"'- was the history of the universe written before its beginning? if so, why do we know we make free choices? if not, how can we affect the course of the future...or the past?'" (p. 21)
We can know that some of our choices are free in the sense of uncoerced and unconstrained but it does not follow from this that such choices are not causally determined. Actions are either determined or random and neither of these kinds of action is free in the philosophical "free will" sense. How would indeterminism prevent us from affecting the future? Our actions are physical events with effects. We cannot affect the past because we are not Jack Havig.
19 comments:
Kaor, Paul!
I am not in the least qualified to comment, but I wonder how an Aristotelian/Scholastic philosopher would have responded.
Ad astra! Sean
Sean,
Scholastics would insist on philosophical free will which I think is a mere religious dogma.
Paul.
Kaor, Paul!
And I think some, like Jacques Maritain or Mortimer Adler, would have disagreed.
Ad astra! Sean
Sean,
Of course they would disagree.
Paul.
That raises the question of whether the causation is determinative; that is to say, wether it would produce the same result in all cases.
There's also the question of whether a "cause' is sufficient or merely necessary.
My own take is that the universe is probabilistic. That is, A may be more or less -likely to produce B, but that there's no one-to-one link.
The same temptation offered to two different guys does not produce the same result. However, the same temptation offered in identical circumstances to two guys who were exact duplicates of each other probably would produce the same result. But, if it didn't produce the same result, then I think that could be explained by random/quantum processes in the guys' brains rather than by philosophical free will.
Kaor, Paul!
I would still disagree. If two men as "identical" as you described still made different decisions the simplest reason for that is the probabilistic, not determinist hypothesis.
Ad astra! Sean
Sean,
I agree. Probability, not free will.
Paul.
Kaor, Paul!
Except I believe the probabilistic hypothesis does not contradict free will.
Ad astra! Sean
Sean,
But it does. A random/probabilistic/quantum event in my brain is not one over which I have any conscious control.
I have heard that neurologists detect a change in the brain some time before a person is conscious of making a decision.
Paul.
Also, of course, "free will" is something that we experience -directly-. It's not the result of either sensory data or of logical inference.
My own existence and the facilities of my own mind -- like making decisions -- are the only things I -cannot- doubt.
The entire universe might be an illusion -- a virtual reality deception, or a figment of my imagination.
But those mental states cannot be.
Note that identical twins raised separately resemble each other quite closely -- in tastes, opinions, etc.
But they aren't identical.
Identical twins raised together, so that even their close relatives can't often tell them from each other are, however, not -identical- either.
They will not react identically in all circumstances to choices.
Kaor, Paul!
I still disagree. And Stirling's argument, using identical twins, and how THEY can make differing decisions is one reason why I disagree.
Ad astra! Sean
By exact duplicates, I meant not identical twins but two guys who had just been through an sf duplication machine as in Poul Anderson's "Symmetry."
We experience free will in the sense that we are aware of options, e.g., items on a menu, and are also aware that our choice of item A as against item B is uncoerced and unconstrained. This remains compatible with our choice either being causally determined or resulting from a random process in our brains.
Identical twins make differing decisions but those decisions can still be causally determined.
We choose on the basis of our motivations and we have not chosen those.
Paul: over time, one can deliberately change motivations. It's rather difficult, but it can be done.
Mr Stirling,
I know but we have to have the motivation to make the changes.
Paul.
Kaor, Paul!
But the problem in "Symmetry" was how the "duplicates" could figure out how they could make DIFFERING decisions. Once that was done they would be able to get out of of the literal box they got trapped in. After that they became, in effect, identical twins who did not always think and act alike.
Ad astra! Sean
Sean,
So, initially, the duplicates were causally determined to make the same decisions.
Paul.
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