Sunday 1 September 2013

Free Will

Here is the theological argument mentioned in the previous post.

"'God has to leave us free, Nat. Would you rather be an efficient, will-less puppet?'"

- Poul Anderson, "Sister Planet," IN Anderson, Dialogue With Darkness, New York, 1985, pp. 81-135 AT p. 97.

I am will-less if I have no will of my own but not if what I will has been causally determined.

Anderson's character, Jevons, articulates the common free will reply to the Problem of Evil. The reply assumes an analogy between the creator-creature relationship and a parent-child or ruler-subject relationship. If a child is about to touch a hot object, then a parent can either negate the child's freedom by pulling him away or grant his freedom by telling him not to touch it but leaving it to him to decide whether to obey or disobey. Also, an absolute monarch can restrict or concede his subjects' freedom of movement.

However, the parent and ruler are more powerful but nevertheless finite beings sharing with their children or subjects a common environment governed by laws that none of them has created whereas the creator is believed to be the omnipotent creator of everything other than himself. I think that this idea is incoherent because the creator before the creation would be a self without other which is like a square without sides but let us consider the implications of the idea.

The creator has created, not from any recalcitrant material but literally from nothing:

heat;
its effects on organisms;
hot objects;
this hot object;
the object's attractiveness to the child;
all the determinants of the child's decision to obey or disobey -

One child's character is such that he immediately obeys. The creator has created this character.
Another child's character is the opposite. The creator has created it.
In a third child, a tendency to disobey is counteracted by fear of the consequences of disobedience. The creator has created the tendency, the fear and their relative strengths. Thus, he has determined which choice the child will make without reducing the child to a mere will-less puppet.

We confidently predict that an aggressive drunk will instantly kick a dog that bites him whereas a pacifist saint will not, yet we do not say that God has made either of them a will-less puppet.

Theists say further that God did not merely create the universe at its earliest moment, if it had one, but that he sustains it in existence at every moment. Indeed, the initial creation, if any, and the perennial preservation are an indistinguishable eternal divine act. Thus, how can we avoid saying that God creates one child obeying and another disobeying? Much monotheism, Mosaic, Pauline, Calvinist, Lutheran, is, consistently, predestinationist. Pharaoh did not defy God by his free will. God hardened Pharaoh's heart in order to have an opportunity to display his power.

9 comments:

Sean M. Brooks said...

Hi, Paul!

Interesting blog piece. Yes, I agree Poul Anderson's works seems to give near infinite scope for debate and discussion.

While I don't agree either that we are will less puppets or that God created us precisely to do what we do, either good or bad, I admit to finding it difficult to respond. So, I'll link this piece of yours to John C. Wright, in case he feels able to respond or comment.

Mr. Wright is a very busy man due to things like family affairs, his regular job, and his own writing, so I can't promise he will reply either here or at his own blog. But I hope he will.

Sean

Paul Shackley said...

Sean,
Thank you. Yes, to hear from Mr Wright or even just to know that he was reading this blog would be good.
Paul.

Sean M. Brooks said...

Hi, Paul!

Your comments here reminded me of an analogy I've made to others in defense of us having free will. I could discover a plot by a gang of criminals to rob a bank--and then, for one reason or another, be unable to inform the police of the planned crime quickly enough to have it prevented. The point being that my "foreknowledge" does not comepell the robbers to commit the crime. And I don't believe that God's foreknowledge compells us to do what we do, good or bad.

Sean

Sean M. Brooks said...

Hi, Paul!

So do I! Mr. Wright is a lawyer and a trained philosopher whose discussions of philosophical topics interests me.

Sean

Paul Shackley said...

Sean,
I agree that foreknowledge of an action does not compel the action. However, the contradiction that I find is not between foreknowledge and free action but between omnipotent creation and action that is free in relation to the creator.
Thus, a child who disobeys is free in relation to the parent who has forbidden an action but cannot (I think) be free in the same way in relation to a being who has created the entire situation, including the child's motivations and even the child himself at the moment when he is performing the action.
Paul.

Sean M. Brooks said...

Hi, Paul!

I am unsure how to reply to your argument. It still seems to me to be a variant of an idea I disagree with, that God's foreknowledge DOES compel us to do what we do.

Sean

Paul Shackley said...

Sean,
No, I am not talking about foreknowledge. I argue in "Philosophical Disagreements With CS Lewis" on my Religion and Philosophy blog that, if someone has the power of foreknowledge, then, if I am going to perform action x, the foreknower will foreknow that I am going to perform action x and, if I am not going to perform action x, the foreknower will foreknow that I am not going to perform action x. Foreknowledge is in exactly the same logical position as post-knowledge. (Also, God's timeless omniscience is not FORE-knowledge, in any case.)
I am talking not about foreknowledge but about omnipotent creation. When I present a philosophical argument, I am conscious that the subject-matter of the argument is not entirely clear, to say the least, so it is possible that someone else is going to clarify it further and oblige me to adjust my view in some way. This has happened before and will happen again. Nevertheless, for the time being, I think that we tend to imagine God and a creature as somehow co-existing so that the creature somehow has a degree of autonomy not only from fellow creatures but also in the same way from his creator. But how can he? Everything in the creature, around him, preceding him, influencing him, causing him has (we suppose for the sake of argument) been omnipotently created from nothing by the creator. If the creator were to adjust his total creation in any way, then this would surely result in the creature making a different choice or decision, indeed making it freely in relation to his fellow creatures but not (how can he?) in relation to the creator who has total control of everything that has led up to the present moment and is even creating/sustaining the entire universe right now in the present moment. I am not talking about foreknowledge.
Paul.

Jim Baerg said...

I have been meaning to read up on the idea of 'compatibilism' between free will & determinism, to see if it makes any sense.

Sean M. Brooks said...

Kaor, Jim!

And the philosophical use of "compatibilism" is something I've never heard of before.

Ad astra! Sean