Poul Anderson imitated the Future History, then wrote seven other future histories.
James Blish wrote two future histories, Cities In Flight and The Seedling Stars, and also a non-linear future historical sequence in which later works refer to common earlier works despite diverging from each other.
See:
I know that there are other future historians but I focus on these three!
(Right now, I am pleased with my succinct summary of Blish's complicated Haertel Scholium. About to walk out for Sunday lunch.)
Poul was sensible enough not to put much detail about the -immediate- future into his SFnal future history.
ReplyDelete(Except for the Psychotechnic History.)
ReplyDeleteThat makes for a good contrast with Heinlein.
Kaor, Mr. Stirling and Paul!
ReplyDeleteMr. Stirling: True, but I recall how Anderson could write "contemporaneous" stories when he chose to. Examples being "Peek! I See You!," his Yamamura stories, THE DEVIL'S GAME, and the 20th Century chapters of THE BOAT OF A MILLION YEARS.
Paul: Yes, but we need to remember how dissatisfied Anderson became with the Psychotechnic stories. For me the most technically interesting of these stories was "The Snows of Ganymede." And VIRGIN PLANET was the Psychotechnic story I most enjoyed reading.
Ad astra! Sean
Yes, the Psychotechnic stories were an exception -- I think he was under Heinleinian influence at the time.
ReplyDeletePsychotechnic History was directly modelled on Future History.
ReplyDeleteKaor, to Both!
ReplyDeleteYes, Anderson's Psychotechnic stories were inspired/influenced by RAH's Future History. But I would also argue for some influence as well from Asimov's Foundation stories. Esp. how Anderson took over from Asimov the idea that it would be possible to mathematically predict the future. Or predict alternative "desirable" futures if certain "wise" policies were implemented.
Ad astra! Sean
From Asimov:
ReplyDeletea predictive science of society;
a humanoid robot.
From Heinlein:
research to produce longevity;
a generation ship.
Yeah, predictive social science was "in the air" at the time. In point of fact, history is an exercise in unlikely accidents bouncing off each other, and prediction of the future is an exercise in futility.
ReplyDeleteKaor, Paul and Mr. Stirling!
ReplyDeletePaul: Yes, Anderson took over some ideas from Asimov, altho he eventually abandoned notions about a "predictive science" of society.
Mr. Stirling: Absolutely! History is too chaotic and contingent to be predicted.
Ad astra! Sean
For example, nobody in 1914 expected WW1. Even those who wanted a war didn't expect the one they got.
ReplyDeleteKaor, Mr. Stirling!
ReplyDeleteA good reason for not needlessly starting a war would because you are not likely to get the war you wanted. As Putin found out with Ukraine!
Ad astra! Sean
Sean: yes, though you have to make calculations about shifting power balances. The German General Staff was convinced that Russia would be too strong to fight by 1917, given their military expansion plans.
ReplyDeleteThis is, incidentally, a demonstration of how -qualitative- differences between armies are harder to calculate.
The GGS was going by the numbers of divisions and corps, and the number of artillery pieces.
Things like the difficulty the Russians had in getting good NCO's due to low educational standards, and the lower level of officer training, and the way personal rivalries and factionalism were worse in the Russian army, didn't come into it much.
For example, the two army commanders in the Russian army which invaded East Prussia in 1914 refused to talk to each other -- they'd quarreled in the Russo-Japanese war, getting into a fistfight at one point.
ReplyDelete(Generals Paul von Rennenkampf and Alexander Samsonov.)
Our combox takes on a life of its own.
ReplyDeleteKaor, Mr. Stirling!
ReplyDeleteYour comments reminded me of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's AUGUST 1914 (both versions). The author was scathing about how the Russian army was burdened with too many elderly, mentally ossified generals who should have long since retired. Generals who should have been replaced by younger, forward-thinking colonels and lt. colonels.
I read a lot about Samsonov as well, and he was, in many ways not a block headed general. His chief problem, as he took command of his army, was not having the time he needed for meeting his subordinate generals, colonels, and giving ordinary soldiers a chance to at least see him. And a myriad of other things needing at least days/weeks to take care of. The problem being that the Tsarist gov't was mobilizing its armies too quickly as the war began.
Yes, IIRC, mention was made of the hostility between Rejnenkampf and Samsonov.
Ad astra! Sean
Sean: One of the problems was that Russian generals were involved in court intrigues -- angling for access to the Tsar and so forth. Also Nicholas was well-meaning but incompetent; it's the genetic lottery of monarchy.
ReplyDeleteKaor, Mr. Stirling!
ReplyDeleteI agree, the unfortunate Nicholas II was a decent, well meaning, and hard working monarch, but weak. Rather like Marcus Aurelius' co-Emperor Lucius Verus in your Antonine Rome books.
Court intrigues were not limited to Russia! I read of how some French generals would intrigue with politicians in Paris during WW I.
Ad astra! Sean
Sean: intrigue is a general human characteristic. An absolute monarchy -- which with respect to the military Russia was in 1914 -- makes it worse.
ReplyDeleteKaor, Mr. Stirling!
ReplyDeleteI agree, as regards Russia in 1914. Intrigue is an immemorially inveterate human passion, as Chapter 6 of GENESIS makes plain.
Ad astra! Sean